• Yuri Verlanov Professor, Head of Economic Theory and International Economy department, Ukraine, Mykolaiv, Petro Mohyla Black Sea National University
  • Alexander Verlanov Assistant Professor, Accounting and Audit department JEL Classification Numbers: D73, K42, O17, Ukraine, Mykolaiv, Petro Mohyla Black Sea National University
Keywords: corruption in Ukraine, hierarchical corruption networks, horizontal and vertical corruption


Using the well-known three-tier model of corruption, we analyze the construction of an elementary corruption network. Considering the public choice theory and the organization culture theory as our theoretical basis, we propose principles of the corruption network functionality, including horizontal links which provide participants with the necessary protection from the risks of been exposed. Elementary corruption networks use organizational mechanisms which, despite the rigid rules of functioning, make them sufficiently flexible and secure. At the same time, even though the main “productive force” of the system is the vertical “client-agent” relationship, the networks, through horizontal links, can unite, spreading out towards many influential spheres of society, where they support each other and thus stay viable. In such an environment the fight against corruption seem to be a simple demonstration of the network’s strength, which gets rid of the participants who violate “rules of the game”.


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How to Cite
Yuri Verlanov, & Alexander Verlanov. (2019). CORRUPTION NETWORKS: HOW IT REMAINS DOING AND PERSISTS. International Academy Journal Web of Scholar, (4(34), 7-15.