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THE PROBLEMATIC OF INTERPRETING RELIGIOUS TEXTS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS AND ITS REPRESENTATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the philosophical approach of Jürgen Habermas to the interpretation of religious texts, focusing on how communicative rationality can serve as a tool for meaningful dialogue within the modern public sphere. It addresses the epistemological and hermeneutic challenges posed by the reinterpretation of religious traditions in contemporary societies, where secular and pluralistic values often clash with inherited religious meanings. On the basis of Habermas's communicative action theory and his engagement with modern hermeneutics, this study examines how rational discourse can foster mutual understanding and uncover the deeper layers of meaning embedded in religious language. Particular attention is given to the distinction between discursive and nondiscursive validity claims, the role of language in shaping public reasoning, and the potential of interpretation as a means of cultural integration and ethical reflection. By connecting Habermas's ideas with broader hermeneutic traditions and thinkers such as Mohammed Arkoun and Paul Ricœur, the paper highlights the critical function of interpretation in negotiating the boundaries between faith and reason, tradition and modernity. Ultimately, the study affirms that the rational reinterpretation of religious texts is essential to fostering inclusive dialogue and sustaining democratic coexistence in pluralistic societies.

KEYWORDS

Hermeneutics, Habermas, Religious Interpretation, Public Sphere, Communicative Rationality, Modernity

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Introduction.

This paper addresses a fundamental problem that emerges from a reality warranting close attention and demanding a deep exploration of its concealed and marginalised aspects. This endeavour can be realised only through epistemic inquiry grounded in philosophical foundations. Engagement in philosophy is a source of understanding and continuous realisation; it propels movement towards progress and advancement and encourages the perpetual raising of questions.

The problem presented here is as follows: If previous societies were, to a considerable extent, successful in understanding religion and adhering to its message within the bounds of reason contextualised by time and place, how are we able to interpret that legacy today? How can we benefit from it if we reinterpret its outcomes in our present context? Is every behavioural practice with a religious character today truly an interpretation of a previous practice or understanding? What hidden meanings lie within that heritage, and to what extent can they be inferred and revitalised in today's world if such a task is indeed possible? Can we interpret those texts with epistemological depth and full engagement with the future? Philosophy has sought to refine these questions through its internal and external faculties, proximity and distance, superficial and profound dimensions, and engagement with the possible and the verge of the impossible.

In our view, this can be achieved only through the approach of the philosopher Jürgen Habermas. However, we shall not remain confined within the fixed boundaries of his thought, which lays the foundation for the theory of communicative action. This theory inherently embodies a logical confrontation with reality.

This theory is further complemented by a set of propositions that, through practice, evolve into elements characterised by methodological coherence, given their consistency and richness in interpretative possibilities. This approach seeks alignment with several general and essential social trends and phenomena to construct meaning, which undoubtedly, in our view, constitutes the very essence of hermeneutic theory.

1. The Epistemology of Interpretive Understanding of Religiosity

Contemporary hermeneutic theory no longer finds it sufficient to ensure the understanding of texts, their meanings, and their intersections within society. Instead, it calls for the reinterpretation and transformation of fundamental convictions through the critique of ideology and the normative content of prevailing culture. This shift is due to the development of the concept of communicative reason, which emerges from linguistic practice oriented towards the dialectic of understanding and making oneself understood, as well as the quest for underlying motives and unconscious principles, often arbitrarily linked to epistemology, whose task is the construction of meaning.

The central problem, according to Habermas, lies in the mechanism for achieving rational understanding and developing categories of rationality, among which is the category of interpretation. Here, the reference is to religious practice instead of religious text within the public sphere. By our foundational principle (our beliefs), we endeavor to reach a rational understanding through which we aim to replace nonrational mechanisms of coordinating action with rational forms to attain mutual understanding. However, this principle confronts a bankrupt reality: "*Why do I live for this?*" (...) Why, then, should I prefer rational understanding? These, indeed, are the foundations of contemporary hermeneutics.

He grounds his hermeneutical conception of the religious text through essential categories such as interpretation, founded upon a unique triad: argumentation, rationality, and demonstration derived from three fundamental questions: What are the reasons that motivate the individual to pursue rational understanding instead of another form of agreement or even any form of dialogue at all? What are the perspectives of sacred discourse? Is it not possible to understand the other on the basis of value? He raises a rhetorical question: does individual freedom and emancipation not negate the idea of existence as it is? This position draws upon the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl, in the sense that one cannot simply choose one stance over another according to this or that form of agreement.

Interpretation, in his view, attains meaning through linguistic standards suited to unspoken intention or, in the terms of Mohammed Arkoun, *unthought*, even when the discussion contradicts the original text. This conception ultimately arrives at an urgent response, although simultaneously bearing a particular behavioural imprint at a specific time and place. The appropriate response to a given question reflects a deep understanding of the profound background and the essence of successful interpretation, which achieves communication. What, then, is the significance and scope of communication? Erich Fromm said, "*How can I be chaste and virtuous if I do not exist? Moreover, how can I have a pure conscience if I know nothing? In the state of alienation, every field of life ceases to function because each field defines a particular domain of alienated human action, and each field remains estranged from the other.*"¹ Thus, alienation represents the supreme condition confronted by the principle of interpretation.

If we recognise that "communication is a form of interaction, an exchange of action among multiple elements, and a meaning within which the relationship between selves is fused,"² then it becomes essential to prevent intentions and aims from turning into sources of conflict. Through this conception, the hermeneutical process emerges as a characteristic of rational understanding, and thus of communication governed by reason that is open rather than autonomous and that constitutes an existential path, for "human existence is existence, not mere participation."³ This inevitably leads to cultural conflict, and as the old Christian proverb states, we have been liberated from the world for the sake of the world. The return of the impossible to the actual, and the actual basis for constructing discourse, gives rise to dialogue and collective action.

From this perspective, we perceive the value of interpretation recognised by ancient and modern philosophers about religious texts. They have demonstrated the extent to which interpretation is reflected in the construction of religious discourse, in delineating its genuine normative significance, which carries an epistemic structure, and in the attempt to grasp sound understanding. All of this serves a singular objective that, over time, has affirmed the need to move beyond the philosophy of centre and margin, one that has favoured the spaces occupied by adversaries of the sacred text within the modern social sphere.

However, this hypothesised outcome conflicts with the reality of prevailing discourse, which draws the elements of dialogue into particularism and into an ideologically structured, foundational debate that has existed since the dawn of human existence. In this context, modern and contemporary Western philosophy,

particularly the German tradition, has, for decades, devoted itself to understanding religious texts and their semantic containers in relation to the public sphere of the audience of recipients on the one hand and to how meaning is formed and the mechanisms by which it operates on the other hand. This has involved interpreting the semantic need through engagement with the theory of religious hermeneutics on the one hand and addressing the theory of discourse and rhetorical communication on the other.

Moreover, if we recognise that the concept of *bayān* (rhetorical exposition) is “a comprehensive term for everything that removes the veil of meaning and tears away the covering before the inner self, so that the listener is led to its truth and seizes its outcome whatever that exposition may be and whatever the nature of the evidence since the essence of the matter and the ultimate aim toward which both speaker and listener strive is understanding and making understood, by whatever means comprehension is achieved and the meaning clarified, that is *bayān* in that context.”⁴

At this level of analysis, one becomes aware of the essential relationship between the interpreter and the space that is to receive the semantic vessel, described as “postunderstanding” in the mode of persuasion and argumentation within Habermas’s thought. This is drawn out through his endeavour, which begins with a seminal text (*The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*), to trace the conditions that produce the existential meaning of the sacred text. Here, a bold and explicit discussion is undertaken regarding the outcomes of classical hermeneutics, which accepts the text as part of the knowing subject, to establish a form of public consciousness referring in particular to the role of the religious authority (the imam, the pope) progressing towards a critical consciousness that does not concede to grammatical attempts at apprehending and interpreting the public sphere.

In this context, the debate surrounding the nature and identity-specific function of language comes to the fore, considering language as a cultural vessel. In doing so, Habermas embarks on a troubling hermeneutic path that contributes to the separation of religious discourse from religious experience and religion itself as sacred while maintaining the possibility of understanding.

2. Interpretation and the Possibilities of Understanding in Jürgen Habermas

Habermas defends the principle of possibility within the public sphere, starting from the notion of method. In this context, he aligns with Edgar Morin in viewing the method as the hallmark of a strategy that fosters reflexive thinking in the face of complexity. The method aims to reach a nonexclusionary mode of thought that enables the integration of fragmented (shattered) knowledge. From this perspective, the method becomes the principle of knowledge in constructing the public sphere.⁵ However, what is complexity?

Complexity refers to affirming a set of partial realities within a compositional conception, which may be heterogeneous or constrain attempts to interpret phenomena naturally resistant to explanation. This constitutes the core of the interpretative process of religious texts, namely, the endeavour to elicit their concealed and unspoken intentions. Accordingly, it is “a dynamic inquiry into the various interactions within a single, multipolar system.”⁶

Thus, Habermas follows a path of enlightened interpretation that preserves the structure of epistemological theory and engages with lived reality. He builds bridges between modern and contemporary hermeneutics to revive the movement of civilisational renewal, which Max Weber precisely referred to as *contemporary Western rationality*. Here, contemporary interpretation aims to confront the deviation against consciousness, which Habermas terms the *public use of reason*.

In general, the contemporary hermeneutic orientation aspires to free will that generates an opinion about the religious text. In this way, the text is transformed into a productive source of ideas that serves the agenda of active existence, deeply rooted in the life of the self. In this context, we observe Habermas's boldness in distinguishing between the state and the church through the principle of justifying the sacred text, which is an initial image of the public sphere. That is, identifying the dynamics of discourse as practised upon religiosity is, in our view, the essence of the interpretive process emerging in place of the overarching arguments traditionally grounded in the transmitted text. This is the point of contention, as the religious context inherently contains political arguments.

Habermas confronted the problem of approaching the religious text within lived reality through the outcomes of *double hermeneutics*, considering that the sacred text contains both proximate and distant semantic structures that must be deciphered. He believes that the text holds meaning both within itself and within the subjectivity of the reader, whether the reader is supportive or oppositional, and carries within it the potential for communicative engagement with truth. This compels us to enact the principle of *cognitive cogito*,

which Gaston Bachelard calls the "psychoanalysis of knowledge." Inevitably, this leads us to establish a shared foundation concerning the concept of the *intended structure*.

It remains constant that "the concept of structure is essentially based on the idea that the whole equals the sum of its parts; therefore, if we wish to understand the whole, we must comprehend the truth and specificity of each part individually" to decode the complex. In addition, "the complex is that which cannot be summarised in a single unifying word, cannot be reduced to a single law, nor can it be compressed into a simple idea."⁷ Here, we realise that the hermeneutic process operates in two dimensions, a genealogical and an archaeological one, to connect with truth and its manifestations.

Thus, religious understanding aligns with two scientific aims: method and epistemic content. This constitutes a critical inquiry into the relationship between science and reality on the basis of the premise that science can only study and analyse the phenomena of the external world in its strict methodological sense.⁸

That is, its primary domain is the domain of the natural sciences. In contrast, matters about the social sciences are far more complex since inquiry goes beyond analysis to interpretation. From this standpoint, Habermas rejects the positivist separation between facts and decisions, stemming from the belief in an empirical coherence that unites natural and social phenomena, one that can be formulated into precise laws, alongside the availability of rules for social behaviour.⁹ In our view, this renders the sacred text a primary source and alternative text. Thus, religious interpretation assumes the role of dialogue prior to foundation. This dialogue is both vertical and horizontal and involves the entire risk of confronting the other within a logic of interrogation in preparation for assimilating the other to grasp something new that surpasses the immediate context, to understand it, and to transform it.

Hermeneutic theories generally address the unity of meaning and understanding to establish the foundations of mutual comprehension, which builds truth in opposition to the doubts that burden ideas, texts, and beliefs in their original essence. These doubts often exaggerate in their suppression of the various norms and values carried by reality or the text, doubts which may, in some instances, further intensify its ambiguity and the confusion surrounding its representation.

Within this framework, critical philosophy has implicitly engaged in epistemological doubt rather than inferential or metaphysical scepticism in search of absolute truth; its orientation is not merely realistic in its initial conception. In this context, Habermas developed a critical-argumentative approach aimed at tracking the mechanisms that contribute to the transformation of modes of expression and discourse, comparing the evolution of reflective capacities and the systems established within the behavioural practices of the religious subject. He affirms that we cannot comprehend most of the intended meanings behind human dialogical utterances.

Hence, he came to understand the symbolically complex reality that constitutes the domain of interest for the human and social sciences on the basis of his conviction that we cannot comprehend such a reality "while simultaneously, even if only implicitly, maintaining claims to universal validity and issuing value judgments regarding the reasons that lead to either support or opposition of such utterances."¹⁰ This is because such claims neither serve the intended purposes nor allow for the evolution of a discourse that respects difference and diversity. The path forward, therefore, lies in rational discussion, in the sense that "rational discussion is that which cannot bypass or manipulate any possible justification, since justifications are the foundation upon which truth is built."¹¹ A truth is essentially embedded in the layers of directed discourse, which is essentially constituted through diversity.

Religious interpretation is rich in carrying this initial potential, such that "argumentation and justification can only be taken seriously if they respond to certain preconditions of discourse."¹² Chiefs among these are universality and inclusion, that is, no one capable of contributing to the subject of the contested validity claim.¹³ should be excluded or marginalised. This also entails the rejection of all forms of deception and illusion.

3. The Absence or Suppression of Presuppositions

The interpreter specialised in religious texts bears a psychological, historical, and intellectual legacy intimately linked to, and simultaneously in conflict with, the principles of reality. This tension fuels the discomfort of doubt and constitutes the core value of the interpretive path as a means of resisting the formidable pressures of rational skepticism. For this reason, Habermas engaged with these doubts and ultimately challenged them through linguistic dualities that inevitably led to a passionate pursuit of truth through present and transparent meanings. The aim is to internalise and comprehend misunderstanding internally and externally (in writing and speech).

This gives rise to a bold and unsettling confrontation with representatives of the deconstructivist approach, most notably Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. The latter viewed writing as a principle of tension rather than a bearer of tension. In contrast, Derrida regarded the source of anxiety and difference as the mechanism of writing itself, not interpretation, since writing, in his view, encompasses the text's authority rather than the text itself.

Here, writing does not invite interpretation as much as it does the reader's context, which intrudes upon the latent privacy between utterances and expressions. Foucault attempts to convey that authority lies with the recipient, not with the author of the text, with the context in which the text exists, or even with the mechanisms of reading. Within this framework, Habermas intervenes to decode the margin and center binary in correcting reading and writing. He discusses the value of the idea within a unified structure he refers to as the *duality of presence and absence* in the text (the text, the reader, the translation), in contrast to the actual outcomes and public effects, it may produce what he terms *double hermeneutics*, in a manner akin to Paul Ricœur.

Interpretation here attempts to penetrate those dualities that have evolved into exclusionary tendencies. In this context, Habermas sought to shift the religious text from an instrumental understanding to its ethical and value-based effects. This undoubtedly gives rise to a new problem: the relationship with culture and heritage, which he calls the *dismantling of possible illusions of existence*. This reflects a precise alignment with Erich Fromm, mainly through his seminal work *Beyond the Illusions*, where it becomes evident that "truth is nothing other than the outcome of the public practice of justifications specific to a communicative society."¹⁴

Thus, with respect to the content of the religious text and its interpretability, the focus shifts to examining the claim to the validity of the psychological and social impact resulting from such practice. This is done through two key categories: **claims to discursive validity** and **claims to nondiscursive validity**.

4. Claims to Discursive Validity

When the linguistic rules employed by one of the parties are insufficiently transparent and when the uttered propositions are not understood at the semantic, grammatical, or even phonetic level, both parties may reach an agreement concerning the language they use. In this sense, rationality may be counted among the claims to discursive validity.¹⁵ In particular, the truth of utterances can be justified only through other utterances.¹⁶

It may be possible to speak of a claim in terms of form. However, it may be rejected in terms of substance, since the proponent of the claim does not act frivolously nor seek to obscure the truth, so long as genuine effort has been made at least intellectually to establish proof. In the religious interpretive field, the expression of truth cannot be accepted in secrecy; instead, it must be brought to public light in the form of something demonstrated, even if this occurs at the expense of the collective. "*The truth of a statement can only be justified by returning to other statements and verifying their accuracy.*"¹⁷ meaning that what is under discussion is the efforts embedded within the discourse, not the discourse itself. This, in turn, forms part of the second category.

5. Claims to Nondiscursive Validity

These are exemplified particularly in **truthfulness**, as the validity claim associated with representative speech acts is truthfulness.¹⁸ However, Habermas once again expresses dissatisfaction with the conclusions of his predecessors. He critiques Émile Durkheim's theses concerning the status accorded to understanding that arises from language, which, in Habermas's view, is severely limited, especially when its bearer is entangled in the problematic of presence and absence. Language, he argues, is sometimes subject to normative consensus and generates rituals that restrict the possibilities of epistemology, particularly those forms of knowledge that emerge from language act themselves by suppressing internal development or slipping into temporal conflict under the same concept of "collective consciousness." This ultimately diminishes the recognition of shared relational potentials within social interactions.

The four validity claims **are rationality, truth, rightness, and truthfulness**.¹⁹ They do not constitute the ultimate goal in context or within the public sphere.

To this point, we have observed how Habermas describes communicative religious reason from a linguistic perspective as a fundamental component of the theory of language functioning. He proposes a definition of understanding on the basis of Austin's theory of deceptive acts to bridge the gap between text and tradition, an endeavour not without risk. He thus sought to construct his concept of rationality on the principle of affirming the validity of civilisational statements in terms of both rightness and truth. From this foundation,

truth can express the concepts of the system and the lifeworld, thereby linking his linguistic theory of action to systems theory.

However, this theory does not fundamentally render his framework a *critical theory*, a distinction that arises primarily from historical considerations.

6. Systems Theory

The concept of interpretation emerged from a critical perspective as a decisive turning point in Habermas's philosophical project, allowing him to establish bridges with the **Constance School of Critical Theory**, which deeply explored **reception/audience response theory**. This connection represents an unprecedented intersection aimed at sharing the legacy of the Enlightenment, embodied in modernity. The philosophers of this tradition sought to demonstrate that the domains of truth, dominance, victory, and persuasion are not mutually exclusive realms devoid of connection. Instead, protest may become a protest of opinion, victory may become a victory of opinion, and likewise, it may become a triumph over the adversary.²⁰

This discourse constitutes an epistemological approach that penetrates a long-standing dialectic, namely, the binary of text and reality, in other words, the dialectic of *subject and object*, which has dominated the public sphere under the pretext of controlling the scales of meaning. This reflects the view that thinkers, within dialogue, must sometimes be willing to suspend the conversation; however, it may be necessary when there is reason to suspect that repressed unconscious distortions hinder the possibility of genuine dialogue.

Ultimately, dialogue, at its best, reaches its limit and becomes recognizable as such. Public communication is, in essence, social communication when it is guided by the meanings of the public interest or the common good, such as the public's right to information and the pursuit of truth. Social action and work within this sphere aim to promote social engagement via the advocated principles.²¹ The religious text stands far removed from such shallow, fanatical interpretations.

All social life constitutes a vast domain for public communication activities aimed at persuading others to change or correct erroneous or deviant attitudes and behaviours.²² However, it is important to note that the *reading subject* operates according to the act of *motivation*, as theorised by Tomashevsky in his *theory of purpose*, and second, by the *principles of regularity* and *gestalt theory*.

From this perspective, we find ourselves facing a dilemma, and at this point of impasse, dialogical thinkers may be confronted by particular experiences of the impossible: the infinite, the unintelligible. Only at this precise juncture do the participants in dialogue find themselves *beyond dialogue*. In rare cases, dialogue partners may collectively confront the impossible, by which we refer to the *morphology of the formation* of the root of essential difference, that is, within the very structure that establishes subjective norms, particularly historical ones. It is from this foundation that conflict arises.

"The phrase '*world of differences*' is of utmost importance here, as it refers to the act of classification or ordering envisioned by the narrator. In fact, classification or the classificatory act, as Greimas states, constitutes a foundational basis for subjectivity and its autonomy. This is precisely what Roland Barthes meant in his famous saying: '*Tell me how you classify, and I will tell you who you are.*'"²³

These endless circles in the interpretive process emerge at the level of the wreckage left behind by thought burdened with what is termed "*absolute inner feeling*", or, as the philosopher Edmund Husserl calls it, the "*passive intentional acts of consciousness.*" Here, contradictions take shape through differences and a certain sense of similarity, although analogies are neither oppositional (as in ambiguous language) nor identical (as in one-dimensional language). Within this context, polar forms arise from religious expressions that Western philosophy has situated within a *theology of possibility*, as seen in concepts such as will, emotion, compulsion, and coercion.

The believer is bound to the essence of their religion through emotional ties. However, many individuals are not believers in the literal sense. They do not submit to the laws of civilisation except out of fear of religious threats. They will continue to fear religion so long as they believe it constitutes part of the reality that imposes restrictions upon them. These are the individuals who, once they dare to renounce belief in the truth of religion, surpass every barrier and shatter every constraint.²⁴

This means that "*the world of explanations and causes is not the world of existence; it is a circle that is not absurd, and it can be well justified through the balanced rotation of an object to the right around one of its ends. However, it is a circle that does not exist in reality. As for the root, by contrast, it exists precisely to the extent that I am unable to explain it.*"²⁵

From this perspective, religious interpretation is a creative and generative force, owing to the interpretive authority it grants in reading and judgement, and because it establishes a relationship that allows the recipient

to envision the horizon of the unspoken and an eminently philosophical dimension. This necessarily leads us to distinguish between *the philosophy of religion* and *religious philosophy*: that is, the exclusive task of hermeneutics lies in achieving understanding, whereas the role of interpretation is to uncover the communicative function of that understanding.

7. The “Religious” Rational and the “Intellectual” Irrational

Contemporary Western metaphysics, in its outcomes, speaks of the light of reason as a common denominator among diverse active subjects. However, this shared ground has led to anxiety, alienation, sorrow, and a descent into the snares of nothingness, negation, and estrangement, resulting in a faltering connection with being as it is. In other words, the metaphysics of the present age reflects a worn-out practice of meaning in the face of any text. Consequently, the central question has shifted from an inquiry into the grounds of necessary possibility to: *by what means, and in what manner, are rationality and credibility determined in discourse?* This is a question that holds particular urgency in the Arab world.

Mohammed Abed al-Jabri did not hesitate to uphold the principle of formulating the question of necessity and possibility through *bayān* (discursive clarity). As he states, “*In Arabic bayān and Islamic kalām? The reality is that Arabic bayān, in its capacity as Islamic kalam or, in other words, the Arabic discourse of Islamic doctrine, does not begin with theologians who responded to emerging beliefs rooted in the broader sphere of ancient heritage, as we have previously defined it. Instead, Arabic bayān, in this sense, finds its actual beginning and simultaneously its highest and most complete form in the Qur'an: the manifest Arabic book. Thus, rationality within Arabic bayān is determined, first and foremost, within the Qur'anic discourse, precisely in its message's dialectic of rational and irrational.*”²⁶ This orientation in Islamic thought represents a direct response to the rigid Western tradition, which must be loosened, and new systems constructed from the ruins of the failures that have undermined the human content of existence in this world by stripping away will and raising it upon the coffins of freedom. This calls for a frank engagement with the principle: ‘Do not let religion merely tickle your ears.’”²⁷

Nevertheless, the confrontation envisioned by Jürgen Habermas through the “hermeneutic turn” has placed us face-to-face with the phenomena of human existence, which resist separation from one another. This entails revisiting and interrogating the nature of prior modes of thinking, which are extensions of metaphysical questioning, albeit in a positive light since their starting point is the active human being. This is precisely the aim of interpretation: a concern with *being*, as it is the source of all necessity or transcendence, or the cause of burial and rebirth along the pathways of reason.

Penetrating the world of the religious text is an existential undertaking of grave significance. It is affected entirely by the intentionality of every being on both sides of its engagement. Moreover, if we may say so and if our interpretive efforts assist us, we might philosophically reject the concept of the text itself, retaining only the intentionality of consciousness to grasp meaning in human thought as it lives a religious life. In this regard, we may agree well with Habermas in his perspectives and religious significations, which he envisioned as universal and unified paths to truth through concepts of silence that aspire toward freedom without reducing anthropology to rigid structuralism.

8. Conclusions

Indeed, we may not always agree for profound epistemological reasons, which are often rooted in a public reality that runs counter to the very process of thought and in a theologically embedded anxiety present at the core of each of our foundations. This fragmentation and divergence constitute the conditions for the persistence of the world of necessity and possibility. It is precisely this condition that Habermas sought to respond to through the *hermeneutic turn* he pursued.

Interpretation, then, stands at a level higher than the mere understanding or explanation of texts. Over time, it has evolved into a framework that examines method, content, and meaning within time and space through conditional propositions that no longer conceal the implicit, even when we find ourselves in discomfort with the experience of existence, the original discussion of consciousness, or the status of the self. Habermas referred to this in his project as “*modernity an unfinished project.*”

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