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Dolna 17, Warsaw,
Poland 00-773
+48 226 0 227 03
editorial_office@rsglobal.pl

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THE PROBLEMATIC OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS WITHIN SOCIETY

Noureddine Anani
Dr., Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oran 2 - Algeria

ABSTRACT

Interest in language continues to grow daily, as its users increasingly recognise its importance in communication on the one hand and its ability to dissolve ideological distances and bridge geographical separations on the other hand. This attention stems from a desire to transform language from mere words, signals, and gestures into a vital medium for exchange, deliberation, and coexistence. The concept of the public sphere is no less significant than language; it constitutes the centre of communicative action where mechanisms of dialogue and discussion are formed around the goal of common interest. This shared objective, in turn, weaves a fabric of civic values such as tolerance, social cohesion, and respect for diversity and difference. Communicative reasons were established politically, socially, and ethically in response to the qualitative crisis experienced by Western countries due to modernity. The centrality of the individual in Western thought gave rise to a self-referential crisis that acknowledged only itself and entirely negated the notion of the other. This individualism and class division ultimately stripped humans of their freedom. Amid this turmoil, pragmatics emerged as a linguistic revolution that overturned contemporary concepts, shifting language from its formal role to the core of the communicative process. A consensus emerged that language and understanding are interconnected concepts clarified through mutual exchange. Accordingly, a set of questions arises: Is communicative ethics truly capable of breaking away from instrumental rationality, or is it merely another form of instrumentalism and ideology, albeit in a new guise? If not, can communicative ethics and dialogue resolve the crisis of coexistence within the public sphere?

KEYWORDS

Language, Communicative Ethics, Pragmatics, Dialogue, Public Sphere

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Introduction.

As contemporary philosophy became increasingly aware of the danger posed by technology to human existence and the dominance that technical systems have come to impose, philosophical inquiries into the subject multiplied to find solutions to the crisis into which human reason had led itself. These efforts aimed at liberating reason and restoring it to its central role. Consequently, interest in language grew significantly, as philosophers recognised its importance in communication and its capacity to transcend geographical distances and dismantle ideological illusions that had reduced the human being to a mere figure in a scientific or political equation.

It is impossible to speak of communicative action outside the framework of the ethics of discourse. While language constitutes the sole medium upon which dialogue is built, the ethics of dialogue, respect, tolerance, and mutual recognition allow such dialogue to culminate in favour of shared interests. This occurs within a public sphere, ensuring that the conditions for dialogue remain rational and free. The public sphere also plays a vital role in facilitating successful communication between individuals and constructing a shared lived world.

The Defence of Modernity

When Jürgen Habermas undertook defending modernity, it was not merely to showcase its strengths but, more importantly, to highlight its key weaknesses. Habermas viewed modernity as an unfinished project, a perspective that served as a rebuttal to those who had declared its end. If modernity is understood as a manifestation of rationality, then its conclusion would signify the end of rational thought itself.

The concept of modernity traces its philosophical roots back to Immanuel Kant, mainly through his seminal essay "What is Enlightenment?" This work coincided with the rise of the Enlightenment movement, which aimed to defend rationality and establish an ethical framework independent of the religious order in place. This entailed a necessary separation between the political and the theological, as well as between the authority of the state and that of religion. There was a clear desire to govern human society on the basis of purely human principles, thus transferring worldly authority from the hands of intermediaries with the afterlife to those of a secular ruler.

Amid this ideological conflict, Kant's question appeared deliberately provocative. At that time, Western reason needed precisely such a provocation that would compel it to emerge from the immaturity it had imposed upon itself by suspending the act of thinking. Kant placed responsibility for this immaturity squarely on the individual, attributing it not to a deficiency of reason but to a lack of courage in using it. This provocation was an explicit call for Western reasons to dare to think.

The Defence of Modernity

When Habermas undertook defending modernity, it was not merely exhibiting its strengths but, more importantly, highlighting its principal weaknesses. Habermas regarded modernity as an unfinished project, a standpoint that served as a rebuttal to those who proclaimed its demise. If modernity is understood as a manifestation of rationality, then its end would signify the end of rationality itself.

The idea of modernity traces back to Kant and is particularly associated with his essay *What Is Enlightenment?*. The publication of this work coincided with the emergence of the Enlightenment movement, which sought to defend rationality and establish a moral order as an alternative to the prevailing religious system. This entailed “the necessity of separating the political from the theological, and the authority of the state from the authority of religion; for there was a desire that human society be governed on the basis solely of human principles, and thus that authority in worldly life be vested in a prince rather than in intermediaries with the afterlife.”[1]

Amidst this struggle, Kant's question appeared provocative. At that point in history, Western reason required such a provocation that would compel it to emerge from the immaturity it had imposed upon itself by abdicating the duty of critical thought. Kant held the individual responsible for this immaturity, attributing it not to a deficiency in reason but to a lack of courage in exercising it. This provocation was a direct call for Western reasons to exhibit boldness in thought.

Habermas’ Revolt Against Anti-Modernist Currents

Habermas declared a fierce revolt against the currents opposed to modernity, which had converged around the idea that technology and science were aimed at liberating humanity. He launched a counteroffensive against postmodern discourse, grounding his critique in the philosophical foundations of modernity. This marked a significant turning point in the philosophical trajectory of the theory, mainly as he succeeded in articulating a set of concepts and propositions that had escaped the notice of the first-generation thinkers, foremost among them, the concept of reason, or communicative reason.[2]

Habermas's first accusations were directed at Michel Foucault, who introduced a new dimension to reason, previously classified as unthinkable. This was evident in his bold engagement with concepts traditionally deemed untouchable, such as madness, imprisonment, and sexuality. This did not sit well with Habermas, who was deeply influenced by the Enlightenment and refused to relinquish any part of it. "Human progress can only be achieved through greater rationality and the epistemic and scientific revolution. The fact that this has not materialised in reality and that its opposite has instead come to fruition, namely, new myths manifested particularly in barbarism, does not invalidate the project. "[3] For Habermas, the Enlightenment was

[1] Tzvetan Todorov, *The Spirit of the Enlightenment*, trans. Hafez Kouia, Mohamed Ali Publishing, Sfax, Tunisia, 1st ed., 2007, 126.
[2] Kamal Boumenir et al., *The Critical Frankfurt School: The Dialectic of Liberation, Communication, and Indoctrination*, Ibn Al-Nadim Publishing and Distribution, Algiers, 1st ed., 2012, 279.
[3] Kamal Boumenir, *The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School: From Max Horkheimer to Axel Honneth*, Al-Ikhtilaf Publishing, Algiers, 1st ed., 2010, 18.

coherent: modernity embodies rationality, rationality reflects the Enlightenment, and the Enlightenment reflects Kant.

He also described Nietzsche's stance on modernity as a self-centred reason, the implications of which influenced the first generation of the Frankfurt School, represented by Adorno and Horkheimer. Their work, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, encapsulates this Nietzschean influence, which Heidegger and Derrida soon joined.

Heidegger considered our era the age of technology, a time marked by the domination of nature and ethnic wars " founded upon an anthropological premise whereby man is conceived as a subject and nature as an object. This led man to regard himself as the centre of the universe and the master of nature, thereby severing all ties with any theological or religious reference that might connect him to another world or a higher power. Instead, he came to view power as originating from within, emanating from his own being and will. "[1]

For Derrida, he called for the transcendence of metaphysics through writing—that is, to understand the essence of language not only through speech but also through writing. Habermas rejected this mystical, almost religious dimension that permeated Derrida's position, deeming it a contradiction in a philosopher who sought to overcome metaphysical themes by establishing theological ones.

Habermas transitioned from defending modernity to focusing on rationalisation. Looking back at the history of this concept in Western thought, one finds that it assumes two forms. The first is economic, as seen in Marx's development of productive forces: "that is, the primary material from which synthesis arises in Marx lies in economics, in the trajectories of social life, in material production, and in the ownership of products. "[2] The second form is political, represented by the theocratic authority in Max Weber, which is grounded in the instrumental aspect of rationality.

Contemporary capitalism is founded upon technology, which has come to dominate the lifeworld, and the legitimacy of this capitalism is intrinsically linked to technology. Liberation from its control is possible only through its rationalisation. Technology has transformed the concepts of both human beings and society, following the decline of religion and metaphysics in their authority and influence over modern man. Any attempt to understand society cannot be undertaken outside the dual framework of the social system and the lifeworld. The system is subject to instrumental rationality, whereas the authority of language and communication governs society.

This intellectual shift, which displaced faith from its central position and replaced it with reason, brought about a situation in which instrumental reason "became capable of only one thing: accepting the status quo and adapting to existing realities and events."[3] This shift also led the individual to place knowledge and interest at the forefront of his concerns.

When comparing the outcomes achieved by this form of rationality with the promises it once proclaimed, it now appears as nothing more than a false rationality that has reduced the human being to a mere object, subjected to the authority of instrumental reason. This form of reason has become "the dominant and controlling force in modern capitalist societies, wherein reason has lost its function and has been reduced to a mere tool for achieving specific objectives; gradually, reason has lost its significance. "[4]

As a result of the crisis experienced by Western thought following the failure of the Western modernity project, critical movements aimed at reassessing the foundations of Western philosophy and the pillars of Western culture emerged. The postmodern current arose out of this context, built upon a sceptical stance toward the achievements of Western rationality. This gave rise to a conflict with all who had celebrated the accomplishments of modernity.

In addition to the conflict between modernity and postmodernity, another model emerged on the basis of intersubjective and communicative awareness. Its leading figure, Habermas, began by analysing the social structure and how it could be established on rational foundations, although not in the same manner as Max Weber proposed. For Weber, rational activity is goal oriented; mental activity cannot be separated from technique: "It is always linked to scientific progress, but Habermas went beyond the traditional theses in the social sciences concerning consciousness and action. "[5] In addition to technical knowledge, he introduced other criteria of rationality, namely, the moral and aesthetic dimensions, which had been neglected by Western centrism rooted in the instrumental capitalist project, which was founded upon teleology and pragmatism.

[1] Kamal Boumenir, *Readings in the Critical Thought of the Frankfurt School*, Kunooz Al-Hikma Publishing and Distribution, 1st ed., 2012, 10.
[2] Jamila Hanifi, *Jürgen Habermas: From Modernity to Communicative Rationality*, Algerian Association for Philosophical Studies, 2016, 216.
[3] Abū al-Anwar Ḥamadī and Abū al-Nūr Ḥasan, *Jürgen Habermas: Ethics and Communication* (Beirut: Al-Tanwīr Publishing, 2012), 49.
[4] Ibid., 114.
[5] al-Zāwī Baghūra, *Philosophy and Language: A Critique of the Linguistic Turn in Contemporary Philosophy*, 1st ed. (Beirut, Lebanon: Dār al-Ṭalīʿa, 2005), 23.

By transcending the philosophy of consciousness, which had reduced the self to mere material nature, rationality came to represent a call for awareness and progress. Through his critique of instrumental reason, Habermas opened a dialogue with the philosophy of language and expressed a profound interest in communication, grounded in a concern for language and meaning.

Language and Communication

With the fall of totalitarian regimes came the decline of the ideology that had dominated all aspects of philosophical, political, and economic life and possessed the capacity to direct all scientific activity. This ideology was replaced by functional efficiency, marking a shift in Western reason from a false consciousness shaped by ideology to an abstract consciousness aimed at eliminating it. This transcendence manifests in understanding, dialogue, and persuasion processes that lead to a deeper comprehension of society and the lifeworld, as they are, at their core, communicative processes based on participation among dialogue partners and among subjects who differ in their ideas. Language plays a central role in this communicative process between interacting subjects, regardless of the participant's position in the dialogue, whether speaker or listener, "for this communicative reason is closely tied to speech act theory and to all symbolic issues and cultural foundations that communicative rationality seeks to resolve. "[1] Each participant can defend their stance or object to the opposing position; the dialogue is governed by no authority other than reason itself.

Habermas did not emphasise the performative aspect of language in the sense of what the interlocutor says and understands theoretically. Instead, the essential function of language lies in its use in communicative performance, in what is said. Formal pragmatics provides the appropriate framework for fostering communication through mutual understanding, beyond its abstract nature as language. Every speaker whose language is structurally sound represents the model of the ideal speaker. Correct language enables effective communication among individuals without reliance on ornate expressions or elaborate vocabulary.

The ideal speaker is not the one whose language is filled with rhetorical flourishes and aesthetic phrases but rather whose ability to make himself understood lies in his capacity to simplify language. Ideal communication, therefore, relies on argumentative discourse capable of generating consensus among interlocutors.

Ordinary language represents the primary form capable of successfully fulfilling this communicative task, as it brings together the widest number of interlocutors through its reliance on general propositions. The function of ordinary language begins with initiating dialogue, followed by an examination of that dialogue to determine whether it is open to interpretation "within a context of diverging opinions, disagreement, diversity, and tolerance grounded in shared intersubjectivity, based on a linguistic–pragmatic domain that upholds the principles of reasonableness, truthfulness, and precision, and which rests upon argumentative discussion removed from coercion and domination. "[2]

Ordinary language is founded on two pillars: linguistic speech and nonlinguistic action. The difficulty of communication lies in interpreting nonlinguistic action, which demands reading, interpretation, and comprehension to grasp the genuine meaning it conveys spontaneously and directly. Therefore, communication involves mutual understanding between interlocutors, as these concepts express the speaker's intentions. Full communication between subjects is not achieved unless both parties share the same linguistic standards. When there is a contested matter, they must reach a rationally justified understanding or agreement, with each party seeking to persuade the other through convincing arguments. "[3]

For this reason, Habermas emphasises that the lifeworld is the sphere where individuals weave a network of relations on the basis of their shared language. The success of communication depends on agreement and understanding, which in turn depend on the formal grammatical structures of language. Communication excludes no discipline from participation, so long as it engages in speech, on the condition that it adheres to the correctness of language.

In addition to its dialogical and communicative functions, language restores the centrality of human beings because it is impossible to speak of language and communication outside the cultural and traditional frameworks surrounding them. Language assumes various forms and expressions within this context, such as folk narratives and poetry. The realisation of communicative theory not only serves as a tool for dialogue but also extends to the preservation and promotion of heritage and popular cultures: "this is what is referred to as

[1] Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. Fatima al-Jayyushi (Damascus: Ministry of Culture Publications, 1995), 455.
[2] Kamāl Boumenir, *The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School*, previously cited, 119.
[3] Ibid., 154.

the culturalist approach to the lifeworld, whereby the lifeworld is linked to an underlying cultural space, in which culture and language are but two elements among the many that constitute a given situation."[1]

Therefore, discourse about language must go beyond its formal structures to address its performative dimension and shift toward a broader understanding, namely, the concept of pragmatics, alongside other familiar linguistic components such as phonology, syntax, and semantics. This means moving from the linguistic function to the communicative function, as linguistic activity does not treat language merely as an object of study but instead focuses on its capacity to generate communicative action through mutual understanding within a social theory grounded in linguistic interaction framed by a sound and coherent language.

Dialogue and the Ethics of Discourse

In his effort to purify society and reason, Habermas turned to the criterion of ethics, a recourse characteristic of contemporary Western thought. Confronted with the magnitude of loss inflicted by technological domination, Habermas formulated discourse ethics on the basis of two fundamental principles. The first is the principle of discourse, which rests on criteria mutually agreed upon by all parties to the dialogue and accepted by them collectively. The second is the principle of universality, which requires that each participant accepts the outcomes reached through dialogue and consent to the consequences stemming from those outcomes and prioritises the public good over individual interests "and that the process of social integration can be achieved only through consensus or mutual understanding, which is embedded in the linguistic actions of participants and presupposes agreement among them within the communicative process. "[2]

The ethics of discussion are grounded in a discursive rationality in which the best argument prevails, following the presentation of all relevant arguments and the inclusion of all parties concerned in the dialogue.

Dialogue must be free from the domination of any party or the hegemony of one side over another; instead, consensus must revolve around the most compelling argument. Such a discussion is characterised by freedom and mutual respect, and when these conditions are fulfilled, all accept the outcomes. Outstanding issues are then resolved rationally by the public interest through the presentation of arguments and evidence "thus, ethics appears to concern itself with the theoretical effort to articulate the principles that regulate our relations with others, while morality retains its original historical function: to put those principles into practice and application. "[3]

This discourse is governed by ethical standards corresponding to how individuals live within their communities. No participant is excluded from the discussion, regardless of the level of their discourse or their linguistic competence. In the end, the most persuasive argument prevails. The process of cancelling out one argument in favour of another and the triumph of one position over another marks the beginning of a rational consensus in which reason plays the guiding role in the communicative process.

Ethics aims to achieve consensus on the issues raised within society, and the pursuit of communicative ethics within society itself constitutes a core problem of public discourse and a principal subject of communicative action. This led Habermas to link the pursuit of thought with moral action," and if consensus is achieved through the participation of citizens in free and rational debate, then any obstacles that hinder or constrain this free discussion result in distorted communication. "[4]

Language plays a central role in communicative ethics, as it reconstructs communicative action; it is the medium through which interlocutors connect. Habermas ties communicative ethics to validity claims, maintaining that everything rational is open to debate. In the course of discussion, any party may present arguments that constitute a subject of debate when they carry meaning, and these arguments are examined within the framework of validity. "As for the reproduction of culture, Habermas sees it as ensuring that the lifeworld is endowed through the reservoir of cultural knowledge with a semantic dimension that links new instances of mutual understanding to already available semantic conditions. "[5]

Habermas builds upon Kantian ethics, beginning with the moral law of duty, in which Kant proposed the universality of the categorical imperative. However, Habermas introduced a complementary principle: the principle of discourse.

He argues that Kantian ethics has been misunderstood and attributes this misunderstanding to confusion between practical reason and understanding. Unethical actions cannot be explained by irrationality; instead,

[1] Jamīlah Ḥanīfī, *Jürgen Habermas: From Modernity to Communicative Rationality* (Algiers: Algerian Society for (Philosophical Studies, 2016), 183.
[2] Kamāl Boumenir, *op. cit.*, 118.
[3] Jürgen Habermas, *Discourse Ethics and the Question of Truth*, trans. Omar Muheibel (Algiers: Manshūrāt al-Ikhtilāf, 1st ed.), 7.
[4] ʿAlāʾ al-Ṭāhir, *The Frankfurt School: From Horkheimer to Habermas* (Beirut: Centre for National Development Publishing, 1st ed.), 105.
[5] Jamīlah Ḥanīfī, *op. cit.*, 185.

reason is often confronted with situations that demand intelligence " and within philosophical understanding, the constant opposition in Kantian idealism between the empirical individual and the rational universal dissolves, allowing for a reconciliation that enables a philosophical conception of the collective whole in which we live. "[1]

Kant does not dismiss shared moral intelligence; even in cases of unethical conduct, the individual is aware of what they are doing and what they ought to do. For this reason, moral reasoning in Habermas's framework assumes a cognitive dimension, as ethical universality aims to ensure that moral principles are comprehensible to all.

Kant sought to establish an ideal, universal, and absolute ethics, one whose foundation derives from reason rather than human nature, as inclinations, desires, and appetites constituting human nature are mutable and thus incapable of grounding moral laws. However, in reality, the ethics Kant advocates can exist only in a formal sense. When these principles descend from their lofty heights and confront the concrete world, they fail to find a viable foundation because individual consciousness differs from collective consciousness. Moral action takes place between isolated subjects, each possessing an awareness distinct from that of the other", and new ideologies violate the interest linked to the social sphere. This interest extends to the preservation of intersubjective mutual understanding. "[2]

Habermas sought to transfer ethics from its idealised form into the lived reality, from a purely subjective vision to a social one. He criticised Kantian ethics for neglecting the cultural and religious differences that characterise society. This diversity of norms, to which society adheres, necessitates that ethics be communicative: an ethics open to rational dialogue. In doing so, Habermas moved beyond fixed, rigid ethics toward a moral framework that embraces individual differences and respects the freedom of belief of every member within the same society "thus, the fundamental problem for any social theory, from Habermas's perspective, lies in constructing a unified conceptual strategy that adequately links the system and the lifeworld. "[3]

Proper ethics must be founded on mutual understanding among individuals and achieving consensus, without any party imposing their moral action as a universal rule to which all must conform. The absence of agreement does not signify the absence of a shared public interest; instead, language can give rise to that interest through the interaction of subjects. Dialogue enables these subjects to transcend their subjectivity, and relocating moral philosophical discourse from the domain of Kant's rational individual to the realm of the actual human being entails grounding values in society itself through the activation of a linguistic discourse situated within the conceptual triad of truth, persuasion, and communication. Language links these elements and can carry deeply held convictions within the lifeworld. Despite the various interpretations and methodologies through which the issue of language has been approached, they all concur that language represents the highest form of speech and communication. "[4]

Language itself is also embedded within these convictions, and discourse ethics interprets the epistemic content of moral utterances. The discourse thus resolves the tension surrounding validity claims, making communication possible after ethics. This dialogue has a dual purpose: the defence of one's beliefs and the willingness to learn from the views of others.

In coining the term *public sphere*, Habermas began from a historical reference and endowed it with a philosophical character. He traced the origins of the public sphere to ancient Greece, which distinguished between *polis*, meaning the city, and *oikos*, meaning the household. This division's earliest differentiation between the public and private spheres is found in the Greek household. The Greek household represented the domain of exchange, that is, of labour and production, and access to the city was denied to anyone who did not hold the status of *pater familias*.

The public sphere in ancient Greece emerged in *agora*, the public square where debate was most intense. It served as "a mediating circle between civil society and the state. It was the open space where individuals gathered to form public opinion and, through it, to become citizens united by shared views, values, and aims. "[5] This was during the era of the Athenian state, when political decisions were made and politics, the arts, and literary works were practised. The public square also hosted festival rituals and served as the venue for public trials.

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[1] Muḥsin al-Khūnī, *Enlightenment and Critique: Kant's Place in the Frankfurt School*, 2nd ed. (Syria: Dār al-Ḥiwār, 2009), 69.
[2] Omar Muheibel, *The Problem of Communication in Contemporary Western Philosophy* (Algiers: Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, 1st ed., 2005), 83.
[3] Jamīlah Ḥanīfī, *op. cit.*, 189.
[4] Jürgen Habermas, *op. cit.*, 9.
[5] Ḥasan Mṣaddiq, *Jürgen Habermas and the Frankfurt School: The Communicative Critical Theory* (Casablanca: Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, 1st ed., 2005), 7.

The concept of the public sphere also finds its roots in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. In this work, the public sphere is not limited to a spatial dimension. However, it is conceived as a theoretical construct shaped by social and economic factors and defined by its concepts and terminology.

Hegel's influence is present in its application through the dominance of Marxist discourse. Hegelian ideas were revisited through the Marxist interpretation embraced by the first generation and carried forward by the second generation, when it was said to have "heralded the kind of science that had been obscured by the ambiguities of religious and mythological thinking, replacing imaginary beliefs with scientific knowledge. "[1]

What attracted Habermas to the notion of the public sphere was its potential to provide new normative foundations for critical theory, which had nearly succumbed to nihilism and pessimism to the extent that it had lost faith in the values of modernity and enlightenment. The public sphere thus became Habermas's project for rescuing the Western modernist enterprise and reviving the Enlightenment, which had once embodied the modern public sphere.

Habermas insisted on defining the conditions that render dialogue rational and free from any form of power or domination, fully aware of the crucial role of the public sphere in the communicative process. He stressed the importance of ensuring that this space possesses the conditions necessary to accommodate and sustain such communication, as the essence of this dialogue lies in the general will and in the consensus of all participants involved "such that free and equal citizens must arrive at mutual recognition if they truly wish to achieve a shared life through positive law, independently and reasonably. "[2]

Within the public sphere, Habermas distinguished between the economic, political, and technological domains, on the one hand, and the social domain, which is governed by moral action. Communication within the public sphere is founded on the notion of self-understanding. Through this notion of self-understanding, participants in dialogue and discussion regard themselves as a single community in which each member understands the other. The idea of self-understanding and self-awareness is not a novel concept; rather, it lies at the heart of German philosophy, particularly in the thought of Kant and Hegel.

Thus, as a philosophical concept, the public sphere attempts to clarify the relationship between the thinking and acting self and its relations with others. It marks a starting point for delineating the boundaries between the subjective domain and the collective domain, and the particularity of this ethical relation of recognition lies precisely in the fact that it essentially involves modes of self-realisation. "[3]

The individual or citizen thinks and acts within social and political frameworks, shaped by historical transformations that influence their behaviours within society, whether in terms of their ease of integration, the effectiveness of their political participation, or their contribution to reinforcing democracy. From this perspective, one can also distinguish between the public sphere, which encompasses the state, "since the economically dominant class has also become politically and media dominant, owning and directing the media according to its interests rather than those of the public"[4] Moreover, the private sphere pertains to the individual, their personal life, rights, and civil practices.

Conclusions

The aim of discourse ethics in Habermas's thought was to highlight the significance of dialogue within the public sphere, particularly in an age when the world has become a global village, following the advancement of technological means and the evolution of media, resulting in the broader spread of dialogue as a universal human phenomenon that recognises no borders. Habermas sought to frame this dialogue within a universal ethics, aimed at fostering mutual understanding among individuals on the basis of collective consensus, free from the ideological influence of the participants.

For Habermas, actual dialogue rests on respecting the other and rejecting exclusion. Adherence to the ethics of discussion within the public sphere promotes peaceful coexistence and contributes to the integration of individual citizens into society, regardless of their identity affiliations.

[1] Abū al-Anwar Ḥamadī and Abū al-Nūr Ḥasan, *op. cit..*, 95.
[2] Kamāl Boumenir, *op. cit.*, 153.
[3] Kamal Boumenir, *The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School*, op. cit.., 127.
[4] Jamila Hanifi, *Jürgen Habermas: From Modernity to Communicative Rationality*, op. cit.., 295.

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